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	<title>Comments on: The trust screen on an OpenID Provider</title>
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	<link>http://scott.blomqui.st/2008/06/the-trust-screen-on-an-openid-provider/</link>
	<description>My online identity sandbox</description>
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		<title>By: Nathan Bell</title>
		<link>http://scott.blomqui.st/2008/06/the-trust-screen-on-an-openid-provider/comment-page-1/#comment-66</link>
		<dc:creator>Nathan Bell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2008 19:27:36 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Hi Scott,
I&#039;m really looking forward to reading your thoughts on simplifying the OpenID login flow.  Can&#039;t wait :)

I *think* you&#039;re right about there not being a data leak if there is no profile data being exchanged.  If it&#039;s true that you can skip the trust screen in those cases, that&#039;d be a huge win.

The only catch I can think of (and I haven&#039;t thought about this very deeply) is it might open up the possibility that an RP could identify you  without you knowing.  If http://example.com is a nefarious RP and had a good guess at your OpenID (or, actually, just your OpenID Provider), couldn&#039;t they execute a login in the background?  They would then know who you are but you might not know that they know who you are (until you login to your provider and see &quot;example.com&quot; on the list of trusted sites...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Scott,<br />
I&#8217;m really looking forward to reading your thoughts on simplifying the OpenID login flow.  Can&#8217;t wait <img src='http://scott.blomqui.st/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>I *think* you&#8217;re right about there not being a data leak if there is no profile data being exchanged.  If it&#8217;s true that you can skip the trust screen in those cases, that&#8217;d be a huge win.</p>
<p>The only catch I can think of (and I haven&#8217;t thought about this very deeply) is it might open up the possibility that an RP could identify you  without you knowing.  If <a href="http://example.com" rel="nofollow">http://example.com</a> is a nefarious RP and had a good guess at your OpenID (or, actually, just your OpenID Provider), couldn&#8217;t they execute a login in the background?  They would then know who you are but you might not know that they know who you are (until you login to your provider and see &#8220;example.com&#8221; on the list of trusted sites&#8230;</p>
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